

# *DISEC*

## BACKGROUND GUIDE



# Agenda

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Combating threats to international peace and security posed by the Violent Non state actors.



# Letter from Executive Board

Dear Delegates!

We are very pleased to welcome you to the simulation of the UNGA: DISEC at Epistemo MUN 2022. It will be an honour to serve as your Executive Board for the duration of the conference. This Background Guide is designed to give you an insight into the case at hand. Please refer to it carefully. Remember, a thorough understanding of the problem is the first step to solving it.

However, bear in mind that this Background Guide is in no way exhaustive and is only meant to provide you with enough background information to establish a platform for beginning the research. Delegates are highly recommended to do a good amount of research beyond what is covered in the Guide. The guide cannot be used as proof during the committee proceedings under any circumstances.

Finally, we would like to wish you luck in your preparation. In case you have any questions, procedural or otherwise, please feel free to direct them to any member of the Executive Board and we will get back to you as soon as possible. Please do not hesitate to contact us with any queries or concerns. We expect all delegates to be well-versed with the various nuances of the agenda, and geared up for an intense debate, deliberations, and great fun.

Looking forward to meeting you at the conference!

Regards

Eswar Chava  
Chairperson  
UNGA - DISEC

Amogha Tejas Sunkara  
Vice-Chairperson  
UNGA - DISEC



# Points to Remember

A few aspects that delegates should keep in mind while preparing:

1. Procedure: The purpose of putting in procedural rules in any committee is to ensure a more organized and efficient debate. The committee will follow the UNA-USA Rules of Procedure. Although the Executive Board shall be fairly strict with the Rules of Procedure, the discussion of the agenda will be the main priority. So, delegates are advised not to restrict their statements due to hesitation regarding procedure.

2. Foreign Policy: Following the foreign policy of one's country is the most important aspect of a Model UN Conference. This is what essentially differentiates a Model UN from other debating formats. To violate one's foreign policy without adequate reason is one of the worst mistakes a delegate can make.

3. Role of the Executive Board: The Executive Board is appointed to facilitate debate. The committee shall decide the direction and flow of debate. The delegates are the ones who constitute the committee and hence must be uninhibited while presenting their opinions/stance on any issue. However, the Executive Board may put forward questions and/or ask for clarifications at all points of time to further debate and test participants.

4. Nature of Source/Evidence: This Background Guide is meant solely for research purposes and must not be cited as evidence to substantiate statements made during the conference. Evidence or proof for substantiating statements made during formal debate is acceptable from the following sources:



- a. United Nations: Documents and findings by the United Nations or any related UN body is held as a credible proof to support a claim or argument. Multilateral Organizations: Documents from international organizations like OIC, NAFTA, SAARC, BRICS, EU, ASEAN, the International Criminal Court, etc. may also be presented as credible sources of information.
- b. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country.
- c. News Sources:
1. Reuters: Any Reuters article that clearly makes mention of the fact or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council.
  2. State operated News Agencies: These reports can be used in the support of or against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any country as such but in that situation, may be denied by any other country in the council. Some examples are - RIA Novosti (Russian Federation), Xinhua News Agency (People's Republic of China), etc.

***\*\*\*Please Note: Reports from NGOs working with UNESCO, UNICEF and other UN bodies will be accepted. Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia, or newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India, etc. be accepted. However, notwithstanding the criteria for acceptance of sources and evidence, delegates are still free to quote/cite from any source as they deem fit as a part of their statements.***



# Introduction to the Committee

The United Nations General Assembly is one of the six important organs of the United Nations (UN), and the primary deliberative, strategy making and representative organ of the UN. The first committee of the General Assembly is the Disarmament and International Security Committee. It deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.

## Mandate

The committee considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments. The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage.



# Introduction

Governance failures, combined with 21st-century social, economic, environmental and demographic conditions, have all contributed to paving the way for the rise of highly heterogeneous non-state and quasi-state actors in the Middle East and North African Regions. Has the state, then, been irremediably undermined, or will the current transition lead to the emergence of new state entities? How can the crumbling of states and the redrawing of borders be reconciled with the exacerbation of traditional inter-state competition, including through proxy wars? How can a new potential regional order be framed and imagined?

Since the end of the Cold War, it has been highlighted that there was a shift in the power of policies in the international system. The predominance of the state as a conceptual and practical pillar has declined in the face of the rising centrality of non-state actors in the conduct of international relations. Non-state actors, possessing military capabilities operating outside the direct hierarchical control of the state, are increasingly defining trends in global and regional politics

Africa, despite the considerable recent developments, continues to be associated with violence and human rights abuses perpetrated by a host of violent Non-State Actors and numerous disreputable governments. The International Security continues to be largely influenced by the presence of Non-State Actors and their prominent presence in a volatile region like Africa is a matter of grave concern. Before discussing about the threats posed by them, it is imperative to define the term 'Non-State Actors' hereby referred to as NSAs.



## Non-State Actors

Non-state actors are entities that participate or act in international relations, with sufficient power to influence and cause change without any affiliation to established institutions of a state. These individuals or organizations have significant political, economic, or social influence without being allied to any particular country or state. Few UN experts report that, 'a non-state actor can be any actor on the international stage other than a sovereign state'.

The concept of non-state actors should include organisations that are largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control, and emanate from civil society or the market economy or from 'political impulses' beyond the control of the State. It also includes organisations that operate as, or participate in networks that extend the boundaries of two or more states, thus engaging in transnational relations, linking political systems, economies and societies. Finally, it includes organisations that seek to affect political outcomes either within one or more states or within international institutions.

While NSAs like IGOs play a crucial role in maintaining International Peace, the infamous NSAs like the Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) pose a serious threat to International Peace and Security. In international relations, violent non-state actors (VNSA) are individuals and groups that are wholly or partly independent of state governments and which threaten to or use violence to achieve their goals.



### North African Region

Africa is the world's second largest and second most-populous continent, being behind Asia in both categories. The UN subregion of North Africa consists of countries at the northernmost part of the continent -- Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara. This region though economically prosperous is tormented by the presence of VNSAs. Central Africa, defined by the UN Subregion, consists of the countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé & Príncipe. Apart from these, the African countries like Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Burundi, Somalia etc. are also regions of great interest due to their current situations. This region of Africa serves as a safe haven to a variety of VNSAs like the Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, ISIS, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb etc.

### Prominent NSA groups in Africa

**Boko Haram:** Boko Haram emerged as a violent non-state actor in early 2000s in northeastern Nigeria, specifically in three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. The group started as a conglomerate of just a few zealous Islamists (calling themselves “Nigerian Taliban”). Their strict puritanical interpretation of Islam quickly drew them into conflict with local community. Several scholars have given various explanations for the rise of Boko Haram ranging from religious motivations, socio-economic grievances against the Nigerian state, the fragmentation of sacred authority, political elite manipulations for the control of local and central power etc.




**Al-Shabaab:** Shabaab in Somalia, commit senseless, gratuitous violence than earlier groups, which were often brutal and pushes them to the category of 'warlord'. External attacks against Kenya and Uganda have also bought accusations the Al-Shabaab is a part of global network of terrorists, and entertains connections with Al-Qaeda.

**ISIS:** The rise of violent Libyan Islamist groups precedes the fall of Gaddafi led as the tie between ISIS and Libya, and its counterparts. Like Nigeria even in Libya, due to history of Islamic movements and failure in Libya's security apparatus and breakdown of civil-military relations the Foreign Islamist groups such as ISIS took advantage

**Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM):** The terrorist group successfully took advantage of local dynamics to claim and control territory in Mali. By hijacking the secessionist movement of Tuareg rebels, AQIM and its allies were able to exploit the government's failed security policies and the general breakdown of the military apparatus. The prevalence of existing Islamist movements and a weak and corrupt govt. within a large and porous state created an opportunity for a well-armed group to emerge.

**Anti-balaka:** Anti-balaka translates to anti-machete are carrying out violent attacks in an effort to ethnically cleanse Muslims in Central African Republic. As the Seleka rebels withdrew, the international forces allowed the anti-balaka militias to take control of town after town, resulting in violence and forcible expulsion of Muslim communities.

**Allied Democratic Forces (ADF):** It is a group of rebels that operates on the margins of extreme violence and is prominent in Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. This group claims to have an Islamic affiliation, suggesting a closer connection to Islamic terrorist than to a typical rebel group. This group originally aspired to overthrow the govt. in Uganda and replace it with Islamist rule.



Pirates: Political weakness, economic failures and an opportunity for quick/easy income has led to piracy off the Somalian coast and the Gulf of Guinea. These Violent Non-State Actors are motivated for financial interests but have been promoted by political and economic circumstances beyond their control.



### Reasons behind the rise in violence due to NSAs:

Violence due to NSAs is not a new concept in Africa and it has been plaguing the continent since time immemorial. However, it is horrifying that countries such as Algeria, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Rwanda, and others have seen a considerable increase in terrorist acts in recent years.

A little insight into the reasons behind this reveals that there are several explanations of why there is such a rise and some believe that this can be attributed to poor economic conditions, which is consistent with the popular theory of deprivation and poverty; low education attainment, and historical events such as slavery and ethnic conflicts etc. However, there are studies that suggest otherwise and the rise of NSAs and the violence in Africa is attributed to a different set of reasons:

**Religious Extremism:** Extremists are increasingly shaping the image of Islam in Africa. The rise of mass anti-Sufi and pro-Salafi radical Islamist movements challenged the legitimacy of hereditary Muslim leaders (Emirs, the Sultan of Sokoto and clerics) on theological and doctrinal practices of Islam, as a dominant religious faith in Northern Nigeria. It is vital to mention that the fundamental ideology of ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab rests on Wahhabism- a doctrine that views the world in black-and-white and aims at bringing Islam to its purest form, rejecting religious innovation and polytheism. This suggests that religious extremism is the main driving force for a majority of the NSAs and it is indispensable to consider this in the attempts to combat the threats posed by non-state actors.



**Instability and poor governance:** Stability is an integral element in maintaining peace and security in any region. But most African countries have mixed regimes with some elements of democracy mixed with strong autocratic features which present a façade of democracy but lack its substantive elements and are more unstable and prone to disruptions. This political instability and poor governance have resulted in Africa becoming a safe haven for the VNSAs.

Moreover, the incompetence of the authorities has resulted in the procurement of small arms by NSAs. For example, it has been reported that in Somalia the arms transfers from the US found their way to al Shabaab due to corruption in the ranks of the Somali National Army. Similarly, there are reports that suggest that Boko Haram may have supporters within the state structures in Nigeria, particularly in North Nigeria.

**Poor Implementation of Counter-Violence Frameworks:** Despite the existence of many instruments to counter violence, terror networks continue to operate in the region, mainly due to the poor implementation of the frameworks by the member states. For example, the 2004 Counter Terrorism Protocol needed ratification by minimum 15 states before it could come into force. However, it took more than a decade to finally operationalize this key instrument in 2014. Moreover, some of the key states facing terror attacks such as Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Chad are yet to ratify it.



### Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle East

Within the broader category of non-state actors, the emergence of a range of armed groups across the Middle East has attracted great concern and international attention. The phenomenon of violent non-state actors is global in scope and by no means limited to the Middle East. Armed actors that are not formally linked to the State threaten security in different settings around the world. As with non-state actors, the category of violent non-state actor is also broad.

Violent challengers to the State's monopoly on the use of force can take many different forms, including tribal and ethnic groups, warlords, drug traffickers, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents and transnational terrorist organisations. Nor are their concerns always primarily political or directed towards the state level. Many are motivated less by ideology than by profit-seeking, while others are driven by local concerns. Examples include armed drug lords in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and elsewhere, international smuggling rings, mafia-type organisations, community-based vigilantes and private security forces that have emerged in both politically stable and unstable countries.

In the Arab world, the social and political conditions which followed the uprisings of 2011 have provided the setting for the emergence of an array of armed non-state actors in several states.



## Libya

The fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya saw the emergence of a host of armed militias. Initial estimates of their numbers varied from 100 to 300 such groups with some 125,000 individuals under arms. By 2014, it was believed that up to 1,600 militia groups existed. These are regionally based and comprise Islamist and non-Islamist actors. The most significant are in Zintan, Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. Since 2012, militias or coalitions of militias have become increasingly politicised through affiliations with the major political parties in the country.

These affiliations draw on kinship, regional, tribal, as well as religious and ideological linkages. A significant number of armed groups have been incorporated into two larger coalitions – the Libya Shield Force and the Supreme Security Committee, both of which were established as transitional security forces under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior respectively.

However, the militias retain a high degree of autonomy and pursue their own agendas. They range from ideological and political to local, individualistic and sometimes criminal. The situation is exacerbated by the weakness of the national army which was deliberately neglected under the old regime. The militias have also been drawn into the ongoing conflict in Libya between the Islamist-dominated General National Congress based in Tripoli and the House of Representatives based in Tobruk, each of which in turn draw on regional and international support.



## Yemen

In Yemen, for much of the past fifteen years, international attention focused on the violent Sunni radicals of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Al-Qaeda first attracted the concern of international observers when it launched an attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbour in 2000, killing 17 US servicemen. Many believe that former President Saleh stoked the jihadist threat in order to secure military and financial support from the US – he was widely suspected of complicity in the escape from prison in 2006 of a number of convicted terrorists. In 2012, a group linked with AQAP took advantage of the security vacuum that followed the fall of the Saleh regime to expand the territory under its control in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces.

It was when the independent youth movements were joined by non-state actors, in the form of labour activists, and the youth wings of political parties of all ideological orientations, secular as well as Islamist, that the demise of the Mubarak regime became inevitable.


More recently, attention has shifted from AQAP to another Yemeni non-state actor, the Houthi movement, a Shia Zaydi group which over a six month period advanced from its stronghold in the north of the country to seize control of the capital Sanaa in September 2014. This prompted a Saudi-led intervention which had as its objective the restoration of political settlement put in place by the Gulf Cooperation Council when former President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally resigned his office in November 2011. In the intervening period, at least 2,600 people have lost their lives while, according to UN estimates, at least six million Yemenis are slipping into severe hunger.



The Houthi movement began in the Saada province in 2004 when anti-government demonstrations and disturbances by members of a group known as the Zaydi Believing Youth (Shabab al-Mumin) movement spread to Sanaa with protesters criticising the regime for its cooperation with the United States in counterterrorism. When the government tried to arrest the leader of the movement, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, fighting broke out. Since 2004, there have been six bouts of fighting with the loss of several thousand lives (including that of al-Houthi) and very significant internal displacement of the population. Despite several ceasefires – the most recent was reached in February 2010 – the government did little to address the underlying causes of the violence which were then transformed from locally driven concerns of marginalisation and economic underdevelopment to widespread anger and dissatisfaction with the regime

### Iraq

ISIS first came to attention in December of 2013 when it seized control of Fallujah and Ramadi, two major cities in the Anbar province of Iraq in the west of the country. Nearly all of Anbar's population is Sunni Muslim in a country whose government has been dominated by representatives of its Shia majority since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as it was then known, had its origins in Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which in turn was a direct response to the US invasion. AQI had its stronghold in Anbar but by 2008 had alienated many because of its extreme violence. The resulting backlash and the US-supported 'surge' largely eliminated the influence of AQI. However, under the leadership of Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, the group entered the conflict in neighbouring Syria, where it established a presence in several Syrian governorates. In April of 2013, the group became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Finally, having extended its control over a substantial area straddling Syria and Iraq, the group declared a global Islamic caliphate and renamed itself the 'Islamic State' (it is still commonly referred to as ISIS).



As with violent non-state actors elsewhere in the region, the emergence of IS is inextricably connected to the problem of state legitimacy in Iraq. The dramatic territorial expansion of IS is linked to the failings of the Iraqi state since the US invasion of 2003 and especially the sectarian approach pursued by Nouri al-Maliki, Prime Minister of the country from 2006 to 2014. Maliki, a leading figure in the Shia Dawa party, systematically alienated political opinion in the country, in particular the Sunni minority that had dominated public life since Iraqi independence in 1932.

After taking office, Maliki oversaw a system characterised by the systematic exclusion and harassment of Sunnis, the emergence of shadowy Shia militias suspected of murder, the politicisation and corruption of the judiciary and the security services, and a military apparatus in which battle commands were reportedly for sale to the highest bidder. The inability of Maliki to transcend the mistrust of Iraq's Sunni minority characterised his time in office, during almost all of which he enjoyed the support, however grudging it may have been, of both the US and Iran, the most significant power-brokers in the country. The alienation of Sunnis and other Iraqis has created fertile ground for the expansion of radical opposition to central government in Baghdad.

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


However, ISIS is not the only non-state actor that is active in Iraq. Indeed, the expansion of the group has provoked the emergence (or re-emergence) of others seeking to repel its further expansion and to expel it from territory already under its control. Non-state anti-ISIS forces include Dwekh Nawsha, an armed Assyrian Christian group established in 2014 and the Sinjar Resistance Units (SRU), a Yazdi militia which emerged in response to the takeover by ISIS of the Sinjar province, the Yazdi heartland in Iraq. The SRU, in turn, have been supported and trained by the Kurdish People's Party (PKK). Shia militias, backed by Iran, have also been prominent in fighting against ISIS. However, some have been accused of war crimes and human rights abuses against the Sunni population. Amongst other things, these risks deepening the alienation of Iraqi Sunnis which provides increasingly fertile ground for ISIS support.

### Syria

The conflict that developed in Syria after the violent suppression of the initial protests against the regime of Bashar al-Assad quickly morphed into a widespread and multi-layered insurgency. The conflict between the Syrian regime and anti-regime non-state actors has cost at least 200,000 lives to date. Three million people are estimated to have fled to neighbouring countries while a further 6.5 million are internally displaced (out of a total population of 22 million).

According to US intelligence reports, by February 2014, there were between 75,000 and 115,000 anti-regime insurgents organised in 1,500 armed groups of widely varying political orientations. Although many within the opposition to the regime share antipathy towards the brutality of the regime and of ISIS, there remain significant divisions over tactics, strategy and long-term goals. Anti-regime non-state actors in Syria, as elsewhere include Islamist and non-Islamist elements while there are significant divisions within the Islamist camp between those who oppose the violent extremism of ISIS and other militias such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.



ISIS controls large areas of the north east of the country as well as some areas on the borders with Turkey and Iraq. In 2014, it was estimated that ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham had 26,000 members, including 12,000 foreign fighters, of whom 1,000 were Europeans and 100 were US citizens. In late 2013, a number of Islamist militias set up the Islamic Front and moved to evict ISIS from areas of Syria under its control. The Islamic Front has less clear-cut relations with Jabhat al-Nusra, with which it has cooperated on some occasions, while engaging in conflict on others.

Also ranged against the regime is the Free Syria Army (FSA), which was formed in August 2011 by army defectors who sought the removal of the Assad regime. The FSA consists of a number of disparate armed groups – some secular and some Islamist in orientation. However, it is not a unified, cohesive fighting force although several attempts have been made for it to become as such.




# CASE STUDY - AFGHANISTAN TALIBAN TAKEOVER

The Taliban is by far one of the best examples of Violent Non-state Actors. The Taliban was formed in the early 1990s by Afghan mujahideen, or Islamic guerilla fighters, who had resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89) with the covert backing of the CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI). The Taliban emphasize religious and cultural differences between the West and the East, the idea of the clash of civilisations, denounce the West as oppressive against Islam, call the War on terror a War against Islam, and condemn the international forces as "occupiers and invaders." They portray the government of Afghanistan as its puppet, and the reconstruction works as "efforts of Christianizing Afghanistan," by using civilian casualties of air strikes and using media reports of prisoners' abuses and mistreatment in their favor.

## How did the Taliban take over Afghanistan?

Taliban took advantage of the flaws of the ruling Afghan government and used the time to rebuild a framework to take over Afghanistan. The Taliban started a chain reaction from the south of Afghanistan by pooling people, weapons, intel and resources. Gradually, the Taliban were able to capture the capital of Afghanistan-Kabul.

The Taliban is known for funding itself from Illicit drug trade that is highly prevalent in Afghanistan. Due to the access to funds and weapons, the Taliban take over was made easy. Corrupt officials also aided the Taliban by providing funds, armory and intel.



How has the Taliban been proven stronger than the measures by the Afghan Government and U.S?

The Afghanistan government, being vastly corrupted at the high levels, did not have a strong framework and the command to oppose the Taliban. Hence, the weak oppression eased the situation for the Taliban.

The Taliban used each of the counter-propaganda to its own advantage in various ways. Taliban used various forms of media from the village-level itself to gain support, which contributed to its revolt to take over the Afghan government. The failure of the U.S's moves, such as airstrikes and lack of actionable intelligence also favoured the Taliban's movement.

#### DOHA Agreement

The Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, commonly known as the US-Taliban deal or the Doha Agreement, was a peace agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban on February 29, 2020 in Doha, Qatar, to bring an end to the 2001-2021 war in Afghanistan. Adhering to the conditions of the deal, the US dramatically reduced the number of US air raids, leaving the ANDSF without a key advantage in keeping the Taliban at bay.

#### Conclusion

The main reasons for the Taliban takeover are fairly simple. The increase in the factions against the previous government. The funding to the Taliban by both state and non-state actors. The flawed government laws and implementation that led to the rise of the Taliban in the first place. More than 70,000 Afghani and Pakistani civilians have died due to the civil war in Afghanistan.



# Threats posed to International Security

International security, also called global security, refers to the amalgamation of measures taken by states and international organizations, (such as the United Nations for instance), to ensure mutual survival and safety. International security is national security or state security in the global arena. Violent Non-State Actors pose serious threats to the International Security.

NSA and WMDs: The acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction by the Non-State Actors is probably the deadliest combination of two major factors threatening International Security and there are legitimate concerns about the security of large stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile material outside international regulation. Preventing non state actors from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction is among the most important responsibilities of the international community.

Aggravating Civil Wars: Armed non state conflict without the direct involvement of the state government is a common phenomenon in Africa. Inter-rebel clashes are important elements of complex civil wars such as in Syria or Sudan. Many countries are largely spared by civil conflicts against the state, yet see devastating violent non state conflict between gangs or communal militias. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) registered a total of 454 such non state conflicts around the world in the time period 1989-2011. These violent conflicts together caused more than 100,000 fatalities and around 70% of non-state conflicts and the fatalities incurred were registered in Africa.



Illegal Trade: The UN recognizes the threat posed by transnational and non-State actors involved in drugs and crime as one of the greatest challenges to international security and peace. Illegal trade is the major source of income for the majority of the NSAs in Africa. Their involvement in the small arms trade and drug trafficking remains to be an issue of great concern. Apart from these, the smuggling activities by the Pirates pose a serious threat to the Maritime Security in Africa.

Threats to Civilian lives: The recent famine which hit Africa was deemed the largest humanitarian crisis in the history of United Nations with hunger and famine affecting more than 20 million people throughout Africa. While this might seem unrelated to NSAs but the truth is that they are a major reason behind this catastrophe. The UN has used the term “man-made” famine applied to the current famine in Africa as it is primarily caused by war and economic collapse and not because of natural causes. Food insecurity has also hit entire communities in Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon and Yemen. Nigeria’s crisis is highly concentrated in Borno State, where Boko Haram has crippled the region and over 184 children die each day in Nigeria from causes related to malnutrition. Islamic insurgents Boko Haram have contributed considerably to bringing about the famine.

Irregular and Asymmetric warfare: Asymmetric warfare, where the tactics and methods of war differ significantly between two parties, is not a new concept but the rampancy and quantity of parties involved in such conflicts has reached a critical peak in today’s global climate. This discrepancy in strength typically results from a non-state actor, an entity that exists independently of state, engaging a legally recognized state. A classic example of Non-State Actors’ involvement in Asymmetric warfare is Boko Haram’s Asymmetric Insurgency in Nigeria.



# Existing Frameworks and Initiatives taken

Resolution 2457: In a very recent meeting that occurred on 27 February 2019, the Security Council adopted a resolution that outlines steps leading towards the goal of ending conflict in Africa through enhanced international cooperation and partnership as well as robust support for peace operations led by the African Union. The Council unanimously adopted resolution 2457 (2019) and welcomed the African Union's determination to rid the continent of conflict through its "Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020" initiative and expressed its readiness to contribute to that goal.

African-led International Support Mission in Mali: Foreign troops including French troops and those under the banner of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and a UN peacekeeping operation, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) were present in Mali since 2013 to thwart the actions of Islamist fighters and maintain security while the country recovered from the 2012 coup and prepared for fresh elections. In the Central African Republic, French and African Union soldiers -- backed by American airlift and support -- are working to stem violence and create space for dialogue, reconciliation and swift progress to transitional elections. The U.N. Security Council voted last month to continue its peacekeeping mission in the country and to authorize the use of force by European Union troops there.




United Nations–African Union Partnership: The African Union and 42 African Member States endorsed the Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The partnership is already making a difference in the Central African Republic, by providing mediation and technical support to the African Initiative–led peace process, and in South Sudan, by working closely with the African Union and with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These operations are contributing to global security and deserve multilateral support.

2004 Counter–Terrorism Protocol: The 2004 Protocol seeks to give effect to article 3(d) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 2002 (adopted 9 July 2002, entered into force 26 December 2003) namely to further the objective of "coordinating and harmonizing continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects". It is one of the most notable initiatives taken to counter terrorism and end violence in Africa.

### **Conclusion**

The emergence of violent non–state actors in the Middle East in recent years is correlated with the growing weakness of many states in the region. States with low levels of legitimacy are unable to maintain the loyalty of many within their populations. When such states resort to repression they typically provoke opposition. Similarly, when states exclude significant elements of their populations through neglect, lack of capacity or some other form of discrimination, they can create the conditions within which violent non–state actors emerge. Where the State fails to provide security or other basic services, violent non–state actors can move in to provide alternative governance, services and collective goods thus increasing their own legitimacy in the process.



The weakness of central state institutions in Libya and Yemen together with the exclusionary and repressive practices of the State in Iraq and Syria have combined with other factors to prompt the emergence of an array of violent non-state actors that pose significant threat to domestic and regional security. However, the structural context from which violent non-state actors emerge make appropriate policy responses, on both the domestic and international levels more difficult to construct.

Ad hoc military strategies can address the problem of violent non-state actors in the immediate term. They cannot, however, resolve the problems of weak state legitimacy and capacity or the absence of effective state institutions, which often constitute the backdrop against which such actors emerge. The situation is further complicated by a paradoxical aspect of the nature of non-state actors in the Middle East. As is the case, elsewhere, when non-state actors take up arms against regimes in some states, quite often they do so with the support of others. To this extent, the 'non-state' component of those actors may be quite diluted.

This has already been visible for some time in the cases of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Each of these non-state actors has enjoyed the support of Syria and, especially, Iran while retaining significant autonomy over their behaviour. Likewise, the conflicts in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen have drawn an array of regional actors into the fray in support of one involved group or another. The UAE and Qatar have backed conflicting sides in Libya. Saudi Arabia, several Gulf states, Turkey and Iran have all been associated with different armed groups in the Syrian conflict. Iran supports Shia militias fighting ISIS in Iraq and supports the Houthis in Yemen in the face of Saudi opposition.



Thus, the problem of violent non-state actors in the Middle East requires solutions that are located not merely at the local level but also at the broader geopolitical levels. Ad-hoc responses that target these groups without addressing the structural conditions that promote their emergence are unlikely to have any long-term prospects for success.



# Questions a Resolution must Answer? (QARMA)

- How do the Non-State Actors acquire the weapons and the funds they require?
- Does the political instability in a region have an impact on the International Peace and Security?
- Why didn't/couldn't many African states ratify the 2004 counter terrorism protocol yet?
- What effective measures can the DISEC suggest (regarding the NSAs) which would be compatible with the regional and ethnic diversity of Africa?
- How can VNSA's be prevented at their grooming stage ?
- How would international collaborations work against VNSAs ?



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